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CHOOSING WISELY:  
ENVISIONING PERINATAL HOSPICE 
NOTIFICATION LAWS  
THAT INFORM AND EMPOWER 
INTRODUCTION 
Consider a family. 
This family consists of a woman, her husband, and their two young 
children—a five-year-old girl and a three-year-old boy. The woman and her 
husband are happily married, as helplessly in love with each other as they 
were on the day of their wedding, and they have been trying for another 
baby for the last few months. When the woman finds out she is pregnant 
with their third child, she clutches the pregnancy test in her hand in disbelief. 
She waits until her husband comes home to tell him the news in person. 
When she finally says the words, they both cry tears of joy. It is one of the 
happiest moments of their lives. 
At the twelve-week mark, the woman and her husband visit the doctor 
for a blood test and ultrasound.1 There, the doctor informs them that their 
baby has a condition called Trisomy 13, or Patau Syndrome.2 The 
explanation contains a frightening, overwhelming amount of medical 
information, but phrases echo in the woman’s mind: “unlikely to live past 
the first month” and “incompatible with life.” She and her husband go home, 
numb with grief, and whisper questions back and forth to each other after 
they put their children to bed. It seems impossible: if they carry their baby 
to term, what will they tell their kids? Their parents? The thought of an 
abortion is devastating; they have already begun talking about names and 
nursery colors. But to continue the pregnancy means months spent fearing 
a day that the woman and her husband do not think their family can bear. 
While this story is fictional, many individuals and families face similar 
circumstances. The diagnosis of life-limiting fetal conditions such as 
anencephaly, Patau Syndrome, and severe heart defects3 can place parents 
in a position in which the right course of action is hard to discern—if it 
exists at all. While some parents may have strong convictions that will 
 
1. Prenatal Testing: Quick Guide to Common Tests, MAYO CLINIC (Jan. 16, 2019), https://www 
.mayoclinic.org/healthy-lifestyle/pregnancy-week-by-week/in-depth/prenatal-testing/art-20045232 [htt 
ps://perma.cc/76PX-27CG]. 
2. What Is Trisomy 13?, WEBMD (Sept. 9, 2018), https://www.webmd.com/children/trisomy-1 
3#1 [https://perma.cc/GAP6-E9CL]. 
3. Frequently Asked Questions, PERINATAL HOSPICE & PALLIATIVE CARE, https://www.perinat 
alhospice.org/faqs (listing those conditions as some that are “appropriate for perinatal hospice”) [https:// 
perma.cc/B28G-QVDG]. 











quickly determine their next steps, many need time to decide how to 
proceed. 
Perinatal hospice refers to a cluster of medical services that some 
individuals choose after the diagnosis of a life-limiting fetal condition.4 At 
its core, perinatal hospice involves many kinds of support—including 
physical, emotional, social, and spiritual—for the pregnant person, family 
members, and the fetus or newborn from the time of diagnosis to 
bereavement.5 The American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists 
and the American Academy of Nursing advocate for such programs,6 which 
are expanding throughout the United States and the world.7  
Several states have passed perinatal hospice notification laws, which 
differ in scope but generally require certain pregnant individuals to receive 
a notification about the availability of perinatal hospice services within the 
state.8 Such laws address emotionally difficult matters, and unsurprisingly, 
they are met with a wide range of reactions. Some find these laws to be an 
intrusion into a sensitive domestic and medical situation, another 
manifestation of the same anti-abortion sentiment that has chipped away at 
bodily autonomy for decades.9 Others believe laws like these provide 
essential information to pregnant individuals who may not otherwise learn 
about a meaningful service to help them through a painful time.10  
This Note will proceed in four parts. Part I will outline the historical 
development of perinatal hospice as a medical practice and of perinatal 
hospice notification laws as a legal phenomenon.11 Part II will identify and 
compare states’ approaches in crafting (or not crafting) these laws, taking 
special note of who receives a notification and when.12 Part III will consider 
the role of the government, the nature of informed consent, and possible 
legislative justifications under the police power in passing a perinatal 
hospice notification law, weighing the legitimacy of different interests and 
their logical connection (or not) to the laws passed.13 Finally, Part IV will 
conclude that two appropriate approaches exist to facilitate meaningfully 
informed choice in the perinatal hospice context: notifying all eligible 
individuals of the care they qualify for at the time of diagnosis or 
deliberately passing no law on the matter at all.14 
 
4. Id. 
5. Paquette, infra note 20. 
6. See infra notes 23–24 and accompanying text. 
7. See infra note 21. 
8. See infra Part II. 
9. See, e.g., Culp-Ressler, infra note 132. 
10. See, e.g., Weber, infra note 25. 
11. Infra Part I. 
12. Infra Part II. 
13. Infra Part III. 












I. BACKGROUND AND HISTORY 
Perinatal hospice arose out of palliative and hospice care, fields which 
originated abroad and first took root in the United States in 1973.15 Palliative 
and hospice care represent an effort to address “the total needs of the dying 
patients” as human beings, including their comfort, rather than solely 
making aggressive attempts to cure what are ultimately incurable ailments.16 
By 1982, some medical literature included the subspecialty of neonatal 
palliative care,17 focusing on the needs of infants born with conditions that 
would allow them to live only a short time. Then, with improvements in 
diagnostic technology, doctors began to detect lethal abnormalities even 
during gestation, and the emotional timeline for parents shifted. Where they 
formerly experienced the sudden shock and grief of an adverse diagnosis 
upon the birth of their baby, they now encountered the shock and 
anticipation of grief before birth.18 The field of perinatal hospice developed 
in response to this new type of patient need. 
Perinatal hospice19 refers to a type of care for fetuses with life-limiting 
conditions, those who carry them, and their families. As one article 
describes it: 
The care model is a bundle of services, untethered to a hospital or 
medical center. Hospice nurses and social workers help families 
 
15. Stephen R. Connor, Development of Hospice and Palliative Care in the United States, 56 
OMEGA 89, 90 (2007). 
16. See id. 
17. Albert Balaguer, Ana Martín-Ancel, Darío Ortigoza-Escobar, Joaquín Escribano & Josep 
Argemi, The Model of Palliative Care in the Perinatal Setting: A Review of the Literature, 12 BMC 
PEDIATRICS 1, 3 (2012) (citing Jonathan M. Whitfield et al., The Application of Hospice Concepts to 
Neonatal Care, 136 AM. J. DISEASES CHILD. 421 (1982) and William A. Silverman, A Hospice Setting 
for Humane Neonatal Death, 69 PEDIATRICS 239 (1982)). 
18. As one article aptly states, “The suddenness of a surprise death was replaced by the 
suddenness of a surprise diagnosis.” Nathan J. Hoeldtke & Byron C. Calhoun, Perinatal Hospice, 185 
AM. J. OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 525, 526 (2001). 
19. A note about terminology: Generally, palliative care can involve continuing to receive 
treatments for the underlying condition in addition to symptom-relief treatments typical of hospice care. 
What Are Palliative Care and Hospice Care?, NAT’L INST. ON AGING, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN 
SERVS. (May 17, 2017), https://www.nia.nih.gov/health/what-are-palliative-care-and-hospice-care [http 
s://perma.cc/7V8L-SHUG]. In contrast, hospice care normally means no longer attempting to treat the 
underlying condition, usually when there is a life expectancy of six months or less, and instead focusing 
exclusively on symptom relief and comfort. Id. In the specific context of perinatal care, many terms 
exist, including “perinatal hospice,” “perinatal palliative care,” and “perinatal palliative comfort care,” 
which differ in their allowance of concurrent curative treatment. See, e.g., Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & 
Gynecologists, Comms. on Obstetric Practice & Ethics, ACOG Committee Opinion: Perinatal Palliative 
Care, 134 OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY e84, e84 (2019). These distinctions, while important for doctors 
and patients in practice, involve detail beyond the scope of this Note, which addresses the scholarship 
and notification laws surrounding this entire category of care more broadly. Therefore, this Note will 
use the term “perinatal hospice” to refer generally to all palliative care and hospice services offered to 
fetuses with life-limiting conditions and their families. 











prepare for loss, coaching parents on what to say to siblings and co-
workers. They take calls at 2 a.m. They recommend family therapists 
for couples whose relationships strain under grief. They teach 
mothers how to deliver painkillers to a dying infant, should the baby 
live long enough to go home.20 
As perinatal hospice programs have expanded throughout the United 
States and abroad,21 well-respected medical groups have endorsed the 
practice as a valuable option for the eligible population.22 The American 
College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists (ACOG) describes perinatal 
hospice as “one of several options along a spectrum of care, which includes 
pregnancy termination (abortion) and full neonatal resuscitation and 
treatment, that should be presented to pregnant patients faced with 
pregnancies complicated by life-limiting fetal conditions.”23 Similarly, the 
American Academy of Nursing describes this care as “an essential element 
of childbearing choices.”24 
These organizations phrase their endorsements carefully to emphasize 
that perinatal hospice care is not the right choice for everyone. Many 
pregnant persons who discover that their wanted fetus will survive only 
hours or days outside the womb will choose to terminate the pregnancy, and 
others will choose the most aggressive possible treatments to prolong the 
life of the fetus or newborn to the fullest extent that medical technology will 
allow.25 Perinatal hospice is one choice among many to which pregnant 
individuals should have access, not the ideal choice for all eligible patients.  
Several organizations and laws explicitly frame perinatal hospice care as 
an alternative to abortion.26 This framing improperly situates abortion as the 
 
20. Danielle Paquette, Perinatal Hospice Care Prepares Parents for the End, at Life’s 
Beginning, WASH. POST (Apr. 16, 2016, 8:22 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/20 
16/04/16/perinatal-hospice-care-prepares-parents-for-the-end-at-lifes-beginning/ [https://perma.cc/2SB 
9-RBAX].  
21. Perinatal Hospice & Palliative Care Programs and Support, PERINATAL HOSPICE & 
PALLIATIVE CARE, https://www.perinatalhospice.org/list-of-programs [https://perma.cc/P2V9-CXM3]. 
22. See infra notes 23–24. 
23. Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, Comms. on Obstetric Practice & Ethics, supra 
note 19, at e84. 
24. Rana Limbo et al., Perinatal Palliative Care as an Essential Element of Childbearing 
Choices, 65 NURSING OUTLOOK 123, 123 (2017). 
25. See, e.g., Paquette, supra note 20; Kerry Weber, The Hospital Program for Parents Facing 
Tragic Prenatal Diagnoses, AM. MAG. (Aug. 8, 2019), https://www.americamagazine.org/politics-socie 
ty/2019/08/08/hospital-program-parents-facing-tragic-prenatal-diagnoses [https://perma.cc/RYP2-7NA 
R]. 
26. See, e.g., Mary Hallan FioRito, A Better Choice than Late-Term Abortion: Perinatal Hospice 
Care, AM. MAG. (Apr. 9, 2019), https://www.americamagazine.org/politics-society/2019/04/09/better-
choice-late-term-abortion-perinatal-hospice-care [https://perma.cc/PEG5-NXXJ]; Stassa Edwards, 
Perinatal Hospice Care Has Increasingly Become an Alternative to Abortion, JEZEBEL (Apr. 19, 2016, 













opposite of perinatal hospice, as if those are an eligible pregnant person’s 
only choices. In reality, a pregnant person can make many choices in 
response to a diagnosis of a life-limiting fetal condition: to proceed with the 
pregnancy without intervention, to proceed with the pregnancy with a high 
degree of intensive intervention in attempts to lengthen fetal or neonatal life 
even a small amount, to get an abortion, to seek individual mental health 
counseling in order to cope with the shock that often comes with such a 
diagnosis, to enroll in a perinatal hospice program, to seek more information 
or a second medical opinion, or to choose some combination of these 
options. 
Given all these available choices, many people who receive a life-
limiting fetal diagnosis do not get an abortion and do not enter a perinatal 
hospice program, whether due to lack of knowledge, lack of available 
services, or lack of interest in doing so. The decision is not simply one or 
the other, and abortion may not factor into a person’s choice at all. Though 
the benefits of perinatal hospice may coincide with some values broadly 
considered “pro-life” (in that abortion is not occurring), they also align with 
principles of reproductive choice (in that, when perinatal hospice is 
presented properly, it can expand the care options available to pregnant 
persons).27 To reduce perinatal hospice care to merely an “alternative to 
abortion” unduly centers abortion as the biggest concern a pregnant person 
may have when grappling with an adverse diagnosis. The choices pregnant 
individuals make are much more nuanced than that. 
II. COMPARING EXISTING PERINATAL HOSPICE NOTIFICATION LAWS 
As perinatal hospice programs have proliferated,28 several states have 
passed what this Note will refer to as “perinatal hospice notification laws.” 
 
[https://perma.cc/H5AU-EK5C]; IND. CODE § 16-25-4.5-1 (2019) (linking notification about perinatal 
hospice services to abortion); MINN. STAT. § 145.4242(c) (2019) (requiring that “[a] female seeking an 
abortion of her unborn child diagnosed with fetal anomaly incompatible with life must be informed of 
available perinatal hospice services and offered this care as an alternative to abortion”) (emphasis 
added); OKLA. STAT. tit. 63, § 1-746.2 (2020) (requiring that perinatal hospice be presented as an 
alternative to abortion before certain abortions can be provided). 
27. Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 3 (“Perinatal hospice transcends the abortion 
debate.”). Additionally, the traditional “pro-life vs. pro-choice” dichotomy is a false one; the “pro-life” 
criminalization of abortion increases incarceration, which has destructive effects on communities of 
color, while the “pro-choice” movement makes concerning assumptions about the ability of the poor to 
make truly free reproductive choices given societal constraints. Andrea Smith, Beyond Pro-Choice 
Versus Pro-Life: Women of Color and Reproductive Justice, 17 NWSA J. 119, 125, 128 (2005). 
Advocates for reproductive justice may assert fetal personhood and advocate for abortion rights 
simultaneously. Id. at 121. Perinatal hospice, which may appeal for different reasons both to those who 
support abortion rights and those who oppose them, is one example of the incomplete separation between 
these movements. 
28. See Perinatal Hospice & Palliative Care Programs and Support, supra note 21. 











These laws differ in their approaches,29 but in general, they require certain 
populations to be notified at certain times about perinatal hospice care 
within the state. In most states that have perinatal hospice notification laws, 
these laws are situated within existing abortion provisions as an informed 
consent disclosure.30 Other states classify perinatal hospice notification laws 
within the scope of public health laws without reference to abortion.31  
While respected medical organizations have consistently supported 
perinatal hospice as a treatment option, ACOG appears to disfavor perinatal 
hospice notification laws. Although it does not address these laws 
specifically, ACOG generally asserts that “[t]he intervention of legislative 
bodies into medical decision making is inappropriate, ill advised, and 
dangerous.”32 Specifically regarding informed consent, ACOG believes that 
the ethical requirements of informed consent extend beyond legal mandates, 
rendering “the ethical dimension of the meaning, basis, and application of 
informed consent” worthier of review than any particular legal standard.33 
These stances suggest that ACOG would not be in favor of any law requiring 
healthcare providers to inform potential patients about the existence of 
perinatal hospice care. 
A. The Three Main Categories of Perinatal Hospice Notification Laws 
Existing perinatal hospice notification laws are best classified based on 
the event triggering notification: (1) a pregnant person, who is carrying a 
fetus with a life-limiting condition, attempts to get an abortion (Arizona,34 
 
29. See infra Part II.A. 
30. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-2158.A.1 (2020); ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-16-2304 (2020); IND. 
CODE § 16-34-2-1.1(b) (2019); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-6709(a)(6) (2019); MINN. STAT. § 145.4242(c) 
(2019); OKLA. STAT. tit. 63, § 1-746.2.1 (2020); WIS. STAT. § 253.10(3)(c)2.em (2020). 
31. IND. CODE § 16-25-4.5-6 (2019); NEB. REV. STAT. § 71-5003 (2017). 
32. Abortion Policy, AM. COLL. OF OBSTETRICIANS & GYNECOLOGISTS (reaffirmed July 2017), 
https://www.acog.org/clinical-information/policy-and-position-statements/statements-of-policy/2017/a 
bortion-policy [https://perma.cc/6FJA-UTMT]. 
33. AM. COLL. OF OBSTETRICIANS & GYNECOLOGISTS, COMM. ON ETHICS, ACOG COMMITTEE 
OPINION NO. 439, INFORMED CONSENT 2 (2009), https://www.acog.org/-/media/project/acog/acogorg/cl 
inical/files/committee-opinion/articles/2009/08/informed-consent.pdf [https://perma.cc/LW9F-SX94].  
34. For persons carrying a fetus diagnosed with a “lethal fetal condition,” Arizona requires 
notification in person about the existence of perinatal hospice care at least twenty-four hours before an 
abortion may be performed. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-2158.A.1 (2020). The state is also required to 












Arkansas,35 Indiana,36 Minnesota,37 and Oklahoma38), (2) any pregnant 
person, regardless of fetal condition, attempts to get an abortion (Kansas39 
and Wisconsin40), and (3) a pregnant person’s fetus is diagnosed with a life-
limiting condition (Indiana41 and Nebraska42). The first two categories 
consist of “abortion-triggered” notifications: the requirement to inform 
someone only arises once that person seeks an abortion. The third category 
consists of a “diagnosis-triggered” notification, in which, at or after the time 
a healthcare provider diagnoses a fetus with a life-limiting condition, the 
provider is required or permitted to provide information about perinatal 
hospice care. This Section will examine the three categories in detail. Figure 
1 below is a chart summarizing these differences. 
 
35. Arkansas requires persons carrying fetuses “diagnosed with a lethal fetal anomaly” to be 
notified about perinatal hospice care at least seventy-two hours before abortion is permitted. ARK. CODE 
ANN. § 20-16-2304 (2020). 
36. Indiana requires a person whose fetus has been diagnosed with a “lethal fetal anomaly” to 
receive information about perinatal hospice care at least eighteen hours before an abortion. IND. CODE § 
16-34-2-1.1(b) (2019). 
37. Minnesota requires that “[a] female seeking an abortion of her unborn child diagnosed with 
fetal anomaly incompatible with life must be informed of available perinatal hospice services and offered 
this care as an alternative to abortion.” MINN. STAT. § 145.4242(c) (2019). 
38. Oklahoma requires that a person carrying a fetus “diagnosed with a fetal anomaly 
incompatible with life” be notified about the existence of perinatal hospice care as an alternative to 
abortion at least seventy-two hours before receiving an abortion. OKLA. STAT. tit. 63, § 1-746.2.1 (2020). 
In addition, the state must maintain a website with information about perinatal hospice services available 
in Oklahoma. Id. at § 1-746.3. 
39. Kansas requires the provision of information about perinatal hospice services in writing at 
least twenty-four hours before any non-emergency abortion may take place, regardless of whether the 
person seeking the abortion is carrying a fetus diagnosed with a life-limiting condition. KAN. STAT. ANN. 
§ 65-6709(a)(6) (2019). The Kansas Department of Health and Environment must also maintain a 
website with pregnancy resources, including information about perinatal hospice services available in 
Kansas. Id. at § 65-6710(b). 
40. Wisconsin requires every person seeking an abortion (except those whose pregnancies are a 
result of sexual assault or incest) to be told orally at least twenty-four hours in advance of the abortion 
that printed materials are available containing information about perinatal hospice. WIS. STAT. § 
253.10(3)(c)2.em (2020). 
41. This law is triggered by diagnosis and is mandatory: the provider who makes the diagnosis 
“shall” inform the pregnant patient “at the time of diagnosis.” IND. CODE § 16-25-4.5-6 (2019). In 
addition, a different section of this statute requires the state department to post information about 
perinatal hospice on its website. Id. at § 16-25-4.5-4. Indiana also has a separate perinatal hospice 
notification law pertaining to abortion; that law is triggered by the attempt to abort a fetus diagnosed 
with a life-limiting condition. See supra note 36. 
42. While Indiana’s notification is mandatory and requires the pregnant person to complete a 
form confirming that notification has occurred, supra note 41, Nebraska’s notification is discretionary 
(the healthcare provider who makes a lethal fetal diagnosis “may” provide perinatal hospice information) 
and no signatures are required to confirm that the dispensation of information took place. NEB. REV. 
STAT. § 71-5003 (2017). Nebraska also requires the maintenance of a website containing information 
about available perinatal hospice services in the state. Id. at § 71-5004. 











Trigger: When does 
notification occur? 




Pregnant person with lethal 







Any pregnant person seeks 
abortion (abortion-triggered) 




Pregnant person receives 
lethal fetal diagnosis 
(diagnosis-triggered) 




Figure 1. Summary of three existing notification regimes. 
The first category of perinatal hospice notification laws implements a 
notification requirement when a person carrying a fetus diagnosed with a 
life-limiting condition seeks an abortion. This category notifies the most 
specific population. In narrowly defining the group that will be notified, the 
state avoids potentially overbroad meddling in pregnant persons’ medical 
decisions.43 However, this narrow trigger may also mean that the law will 
miss certain populations who may also benefit from learning about perinatal 
hospice care. Consider a woman whose wanted fetus is diagnosed with a 
life-limiting condition and whose personal convictions make her unwilling 
to consider an abortion. Under this notification scheme, she may not be 
informed of the full range of care options available to her, even if perinatal 
hospice would have been something she wanted. 
The second category of perinatal hospice notification laws is broader, 
requiring notification to all persons seeking an abortion. For many 
recipients of this notification, the information will be useless because their 
fetuses do not have life-limiting conditions. In this way, this category of 
notification laws is overinclusive. At the same time, these laws are also 
underinclusive because they do not address the entire population eligible for 
perinatal hospice care. This type of law still fails to meet the needs of the 
woman above, who does not seek an abortion but might still benefit from 
information about perinatal hospice care. 
 
43. Government intrusion into a person’s medical decisions is a serious concern which has led 
to significant disapproval of unnecessary state involvement. See Abortion Policy, supra note 32 (“ACOG 
opposes unnecessary regulations that limit or delay access to care. The intervention of legislative bodies 












Furthermore, by the time most patients enter an abortion clinic, they are 
certain of their decision to terminate the pregnancy.44 Studies indicate that 
over eighty-five percent of abortion-seekers are certain of their decision and 
that those with a high degree of certainty are unlikely to be influenced by 
mandatory ultrasounds or pre-abortion counseling.45 For this confident 
majority, state attempts to change their minds by providing new information 
at the last minute are not only unhelpful but also reveal deep biases that 
deny the competency of women to make the medical decisions that will best 
meet their needs.46 
Attempting to change a person’s mind during an abortion visit also has 
serious emotional ramifications.47 Consider a woman whose wanted fetus is 
diagnosed with a life-limiting condition. She decides, after careful thought, 
that carrying her fetus to term for the next several months only to watch her 
newborn baby die a few hours after birth is too devastating. She decides to 
get an abortion, and she arrives at her provider only to be targeted by 
materials specifically designed for people in her vulnerable position—
materials singing the praises of a program that would have her do what she 
has already decided she cannot bear. These pamphlets leave her feeling 
guilty for going through with a decision that now feels framed by the state 
as the “wrong” choice to make. The timing of the notification requirement 
harms her, altering the mandatory information from an empowering piece 
of knowledge helpful in making a decision to a last-ditch effort to dissuade 
her from the choice she has already made.48 
 
44. Diana Greene Foster, Heather Gould, Jessica Taylor & Tracy A. Weitz., Attitudes and 
Decision Making Among Women Seeking Abortions at One U.S. Clinic, 44 PERSP. ON SEXUAL & 
REPROD. HEALTH 117, 120 (2012) (“[W]omen had high precounseling confidence in their decision to 
terminate their pregnancy in 87% of the abortions sought . . . .”); Mary Gatter, Katrina Kimport, Diana 
Greene Foster, Tracy A. Weitz & Ushma D. Upadhyay, Relationship Between Ultrasound Viewing and 
Proceeding to Abortion, 123 OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 81, 83 (2014) (85.4% of survey respondents 
exhibited a high degree of certainty about their decision to have an abortion).  
45. Gatter et al., supra note 44, at 84–85; Foster et al., supra note 44, at 122. More specific 
research is still needed on the certainty of the specific population relevant to perinatal hospice 
inquiries—persons choosing to abort wanted fetuses after receiving a diagnosis of a life-limiting fetal 
condition.  
46. For a thorough examination of the biased effects of restricting abortion access based on 
perceived mental health effects to women, see Maya Manian, The Irrational Woman: Informed Consent 
and Abortion Decision-Making, 16 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 223 (2009). 
47. Part III.B.4 examines the law’s role in the protection of emotion. 
48. The optimal timing of informed consent is early enough to allow the patient sufficient time 
to review any materials, process the information, and ask questions without undue urgency or pressure. 
See, e.g., Clark C. Smith & David C. Miller, Informed Consent: A Form or a Conversation?, in ASRA 
NEWS 38 (2019), https://www.asra.com/content/documents/asra-19-03_final_spv2.pdf [https://perma.c 
c/PS4K-ZUXX]; Owen A. Anderson & Mike J. Wearne, Informed Consent for Elective Surgery—What 
is Best Practice?, 100 J. ROYAL SOC’Y MED. 97, 97 (2007) (rather than obtaining consent the day of 
surgery, “it would be wiser to obtain informed consent at the time of listing in clinic” because “[t]he 
patient will feel under less pressure to proceed”). 











The third category of perinatal hospice notification laws, notification at 
or after the time the provider diagnoses a life-limiting fetal condition, is the 
most logically connected to informed patient decision-making. Perinatal 
hospice care is designed to support fetuses with life-limiting conditions and 
their families; by notifying all whose fetuses receive such diagnoses, the 
state promotes a relevant medical service directly to the entire known 
population of potential recipients. While such a requirement will not reach 
every possible eligible person (because not all pregnant persons will 
undergo genetic testing), this notification methodology makes sense if the 
true goal of the law is to allow individuals to make informed decisions about 
their medical care. This type of notification would reach the woman in the 
example above who would not consider an abortion but would still benefit 
from perinatal hospice. 
A diagnosis-based trigger has the added benefit of being untethered to 
abortion, which avoids the issue of state coercion under the guise of 
informed consent.49 Unlike the previous two abortion-triggered models, 
individuals in this paradigm receive the information before they have made 
any decision about how to proceed with the pregnancy. By delivering 
information at this time, rather than triggering notification only when the 
pregnant person has already chosen to abort, the law better facilitates 
educated decision-making. This type of law would deliver information more 
effectively to the woman choosing abortion in the example above, who 
would receive information about all her options50 upfront rather than having 
the state second-guess her decision at the eleventh hour. 
However, diagnosis-triggered notification laws may still contain biases. 
For example, Indiana’s diagnosis-triggered law has as its only two listed 
purposes that “women considering abortion” know about the existence of 
perinatal hospice programs and that “women choosing abortion after 
receiving a diagnosis of a lethal fetal anomaly are making a fully informed 
decision.”51 This abortion-centric framing is undesirable because perinatal 
hospice is a care model separate from abortion.52 Enacting a notification law 
for the purpose of informing “women considering abortion” about perinatal 
hospice care deprioritizes perinatal hospice-eligible individuals who do not 
seek an abortion. The very benefit of diagnosis-triggered laws is the fact 
that they align so well with the pool of eligible individuals; this category of 
 
49. See generally supra note 46. 
50. “Perinatal palliative comfort care is one of several options along a spectrum of care, which 
includes pregnancy termination (abortion) and full neonatal resuscitation and treatment, that should be 
presented to pregnant patients faced with pregnancies complicated by life-limiting fetal conditions.” 
Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, Comms. on Obstetric Practice & Ethics, supra note 19, at 
e84.  
51. IND. CODE § 16-25-4.5-1 (2019). 












laws is neither overinclusive nor underinclusive. Formulating the purpose 
of such laws in terms of abortion, as Indiana does, cheapens this benefit by 
valuing the notification of only one part of the eligible pool (abortion-
seekers). 
Not all diagnosis-triggered notification laws have this problem. 
Nebraska’s diagnosis-triggered law contains no reference to abortion.53 The 
law simply states that doctors may inform eligible patients of perinatal 
hospice care. While this approach may seem a bit too restrained (since 
doctors are already permitted to inform eligible patients of perinatal hospice 
care), the choice to formalize this permission in a law draws greater 
attention to a lesser-known medical option54 while still leaving doctors the 
discretion to care for patients according to their training and good judgment. 
Furthermore, by refraining from discussing abortion, Nebraska’s law treats 
the whole pool of eligible patients as equally in need of information about 
a potential medical option. If the goal of a perinatal hospice notification law 
is to facilitate truly informed choice for as many individuals as possible, 
allowing doctors discretion to notify according to their expertise and 
treating all eligible patients as equally important both help to meet that goal. 
B. Nonregulation: A Fourth Option 
Most states use a model beyond the three notification methodologies 
listed above: they do not have a law on the subject at all. The decision not 
to involve the government is still a choice, and it should be analyzed as such.  
Many health-related decisions are not subject to complete government 
regulation. For example, many surgical practices are internally regulated by 
the medical community and, when that fails, by tort law.55 Given serious 
concerns about the effectiveness of mandated disclosure regulations across 
 
53. NEB. REV. STAT. § 71-5003 (2017). 
54. “Factors contributing to low perinatal palliative care use include availability of programs, 
patient access issues, and physician education and training barriers. Despite these obstacles, the benefits 
of these programs justify their continued development.” Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 
Comms. on Obstetric Practice & Ethics, supra note 19, at e87. The effects of raising awareness on actual 
behavior are mixed in an activism context. Julie Beck, What Good Is ‘Raising Awareness?’, ATLANTIC 
(Apr. 21, 2015), https://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2015/04/what-good-is-raising-awareness/3 
91002/ [https://perma.cc/EC5U-NSEN]. However, in the context of perinatal hospice notification laws, 
the goal itself is awareness of options so that the person can choose most effectively what to do next, 
and as a result, efforts to increase awareness are a direct means to the end sought. 
55. Jonathan J. Darrow, Explaining the Absence of Surgical Procedure Regulation, 27 CORNELL 
J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 189 (2017) (advocating for more direct regulation of surgical procedures). Darrow 
clarifies that while the surgeries themselves are not normally directly regulated, “indirect” regulation 
occurs through laws about “healthcare workers who perform surgery, the medicines and devices used 
during surgery, and the facilities in which surgery is performed.” Id. at 191.  











a variety of fields,56 including the medical industry and abortion providers,57 
one reasonable approach is for the government to step out of this matter 
entirely. 
The choice not to mandate notification at all, allowing doctors to 
communicate this information to pregnant persons using their own 
discretion, sidesteps the problem of government manipulation or coercion 
more effectively than any of the other notification methods discussed.58 It 
dodges the “gender-specific paternalism”59 of lawmakers’ attempts to 
protect the largely female population of abortion-seekers from a choice the 
lawmakers believe will lead to regret and mental distress. It presumes that 
doctors and patients are competent to handle this matter without state 
intervention. 
However, the choice to keep the state out of such matters also has 
negative consequences. Throughout the general surgical context, the price 
of nonregulation is inconsistency—in performance, terminology, and data 
analysis.60 Inconsistency is not unique to perinatal hospice, but 
nonregulation does affect perinatal hospice-eligible individuals. Without a 
requirement that every doctor notify every person whose fetus has a life-
limiting condition of perinatal hospice options at the time of diagnosis, some 
doctors will choose not to do so, leaving some patients uninformed. Since 
lack of provider awareness and training on perinatal hospice is an issue in 
the field of obstetrics and gynecology,61 the absence of a notification law 
may prove significant. Nonregulation therefore runs the risk of being 
underinclusive, just like abortion-triggered notification requirements.62 
 
56. E.g., Omri Ben-Shahar & Carl E. Schneider, The Failure of Mandated Disclosure, 159 U. 
PA. L. REV. 647 (2011). For example, recipients of boilerplate language often do not read it, id. at 671, 
and even when patients receive important medical information, their comprehension and retention can 
be startlingly low, id. at 668. 
57. See Manian, supra note 46. Manian argues that so-called “informed consent” provisions in 
the abortion context “deny[] women’s capacity for sound medical decision-making.” Id. at 227. 
58. Notably, Nebraska’s perinatal hospice notification law is permissive rather than mandatory. 
NEB. REV. STAT. § 71-5003 (2017). As a result, it evades the problems of mandatory notification just as 
effectively as nonregulation does. 
59. Manian, supra note 46, at 287. 
60. Darrow highlights the difficulty of performing analysis across studies when each one takes 
data at different points or from different populations. Darrow, supra note 55 at 200–06. 
61. Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, Comms. on Obstetric Practice & Ethics, supra 
note 19, at e87 (“Factors contributing to low perinatal palliative care use include availability of 
programs, patient access issues, and physician education and training barriers. Despite these obstacles, 
the benefits of these programs justify their continued development.”) (emphasis added). 
62. Nebraska’s diagnosis-triggered perinatal hospice notification law leaves notification up to 
the provider’s discretion, running the risk that a doctor will choose not to inform an eligible patient. See 
NEB. REV. STAT. § 71-5003 (2017). However, not all diagnosis-triggered laws are necessarily 
underinclusive; Indiana’s diagnosis-triggered law mandates the notification of all eligible individuals at 
the time of diagnosis. See IND. CODE § 16-25-4.5-6 (2019). While Nebraska’s law risks being 













An underinclusive notification regime means that some eligible people 
will not be informed and will seek legal redress. In states with perinatal 
hospice notification laws, a statutory remedy may exist.63 Elsewhere, 
patients may need to rely on general informed consent statutes or common 
law standards of medical malpractice if their doctors fail to provide them 
with adequate information.64 Legal standards of informed consent vary by 
state, so a patient will have an easier or harder time making a case depending 
on location.65 Of course, the same is true of states with perinatal hospice 
notification laws. Different laws contain different remedies, and not all laws 
require all eligible individuals to be notified.66 Therefore, with respect to 
remedies for the underinformed, states with no perinatal hospice notification 
law are not necessarily any worse than those with other potentially 
underinclusive notification regimes.  
III. THE PROPER ROLE OF THE GOVERNMENT IN REQUIRING THE 
PROVISION OF INFORMATION 
A. The Social Construction of Informed Consent 
Most states with perinatal hospice notification laws classify notification 
as a part of establishing informed consent to an abortion.67 Generally, 
informed consent consists of providing a patient with the material 
information necessary to make a particular decision.68 The landmark 1972 
 
dangers of low physician awareness. See Beck, supra note 54 and accompanying text. The deliberate 
absence of a law lacks this ameliorating quality. 
63. Perinatal hospice notification laws, informed consent laws, and abortion laws in general vary 
in their articulations of sanctions for violations. For example, Wisconsin law provides a private cause of 
action for physical injury and emotional distress against the doctor by the woman who received the 
abortion in violation of the informed consent provisions, which include perinatal hospice. WIS. STAT. § 
253.10(6)(a) (2020). Indiana, in contrast, declares that all abortions except those conforming to the 
requirements of Indiana law are criminal acts. IND. CODE § 16-34-2-1(a) (2019). 
64. See, e.g., Fanguy v. Lexington Ins. Co., 210 So. 3d 483, 491–92 (La. Ct. App. 2016) 
(describing Louisiana’s combined common law and statutory informed consent provisions); Newmark-
Shortino v. Buna, 48 A.3d 401, 412 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2012) (identifying common law “duty to 
disclose all medically reasonable treatment alternatives”). 
65. Some states base their informed consent malpractice standard on the reasonable patient 
(asking what information a reasonable patient would have wanted to receive), while others use the 
reasonable physician (asking what a reasonable physician would have told the patient). Medical 
Treatment: Informed Consent, LEXISNEXIS 50-STATE SURVEYS (June 2018).  
66. See supra note 63; see generally Part II.A. 
67. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-2158.A.1 (2020); ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-16-2304 (2020); 
IND. CODE § 16-34-2-1.1(b) (2019); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-6709(a)(6) (2019); MINN. STAT. § 
145.4242(c) (2019); OKLA. STAT. tit. 63, § 1-746.2 (2020); WIS. STAT. § 253.10(3)(c)2.em (2020). 
68. See, e.g., AM. COLL. OF OBSTETRICIANS & GYNECOLOGISTS, COMM. ON ETHICS, supra note 
33, at 3 (“Comprehension (as an element in informed consent) . . . . implies that [the patient] has been 
given adequate information about her diagnosis, prognosis, and alternative treatment choices, including 
the option of no treatment.”); Salgo v. Leland Stanford Jr. Univ. Bd. of Trs., 317 P.2d 170, 181 (Cal. Ct. 
 











case Canterbury v. Spence articulates the concept of materiality well: “[a] 
risk is thus material when a reasonable person, in what the physician knows 
or should know to be the patient’s position, would be likely to attach 
significance to the risk or cluster of risks in deciding whether or not to 
forego the proposed therapy.”69 Canterbury recognizes that physicians 
cannot read their patients’ minds and therefore assigns an objective 
(reasonable patient) standard to the situation.70 This stance is 
understandable; it is impossible for a physician to find out what information 
each patient would deem necessary but does not have, since by definition 
the patient does not know to ask about it. However, the reasonable patient 
standard prompts a different question: what kinds of information is a 
reasonable patient likely to find “significan[t] . . . in deciding whether or not 
to forego the proposed therapy”71 under the Canterbury formulation? 
The answer to this question is inherently bound up in a web of societal 
norms and expectations. There are, of course, some straightforward 
answers; Canterbury itself lists the “options” for different treatments and 
the “perils” of those treatments as a starting point.72 Still, deciding which 
risks are material enough to disclose requires an assessment of social norms 
and the context of the individual patient. If a surgical procedure is likely to 
lead to minor scarring of a person’s abdomen, for example, this may be 
immaterial to an average person but critically important to a swimsuit model 
who is at risk of losing his livelihood.73 
In the fraught context of reproductive and end-of-life matters, it is 
difficult to determine which information is material and to whom. 
Americans hold an enormous range of sincere views on the personhood (or 
not) of fetuses,74 the ramifications of hospice care,75 and the morality of 
 
App. 1957) (“A physician violates his duty to his patient and subjects himself to liability if he withholds 
any facts which are necessary to form the basis of an intelligent consent by the patient to the proposed 
treatment.”). 
69. Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 787 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (quoting Jon R. Waltz & Thomas 
W. Scheuneman, Informed Consent to Therapy, 64 NW. U. L. REV. 628, 640 (1970)) (mistake in 
original). 
70. Id. at 787. 
71. Id. at 787 (quoting Jon R. Waltz & Thomas W. Scheuneman, Informed Consent to Therapy, 
64 NW. U. L. REV. 628, 640 (1970)). 
72. Id. at 783.  
73. Similarly, one article hypothesizes a scenario in which glaucoma treatment has a risk of 
changing a person’s eye color; the author notes that the materiality of this risk would likely change if 
the person lived in a society that discriminated based on eye color. Nadia N. Sawicki, The Abortion 
Informed Consent Debate: More Light, Less Heat, 21 CORNELL J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 1, 20 (2011). 
74. Elissa Strauss, When Does Life Begin? It’s Not So Simple., SLATE (Apr. 4, 2017, 5:55 AM), 
https://slate.com/human-interest/2017/04/when-does-life-begin-outside-the-christian-right-the-answer-
is-over-time.html [https://perma.cc/K6ZX-9EPJ]. 
75. For example, 15.1% of respondents in one survey asserted their belief that “accepting 













abortion under different circumstances or at all.76 The socially constructed 
doctrine of informed consent falters under this variety; for every argument 
that requiring the provision of certain information is manipulative,77 there 
is another argument that withholding it caused harm to a patient who wanted 
to hear it.78 
The risk of manipulation via information is not unique to perinatal 
hospice or abortion informed consent regulations.79 States have certain 
legitimate interests in preventing, encouraging, or requiring different types 
of behavior. To further these legitimate interests, the legislative branch 
creates laws and policies which either incentivize or outright demand certain 
actions. In order to determine whether a state law is an appropriate exercise 
of this power, the judiciary may look to the state’s interest in enacting the 
law.80 
B. Possible Government Interests in Enacting Perinatal Hospice 
Notification Laws 
To investigate the legal and practical legitimacy of perinatal hospice 
notification laws, it can be helpful to ask why the state chose to pass the law 
it did. One common method of determining the legitimacy of a law is a 
means-end analysis.81 If the state cannot cite a justifiable end for which it 
 
Rebecca A. Ferrer, Knowledge of and Beliefs About Palliative Care in a Nationally-Representative U.S. 
Sample, 14 PLOS ONE 1, 6 (2019), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC6695129/pdf/pone. 
0219074.pdf [https://perma.cc/V97V-7DRS]. 
76. Abortion, GALLUP, https://news.gallup.com/poll/1576/abortion.aspx [https://perma.cc/VWC 
5-CGHK] (summarizing different aspects of public opinion surrounding abortion from 1975 to 2019). 
77. Planned Parenthood Minn., N.D., S.D. v. Rounds, 530 F.3d 724, 744 (8th Cir. 2008) 
(challenging required pre-abortion disclosure that a fetus is a “whole, separate, unique, living human 
being” as a misleading ideological message).  
78. Acuna v. Turkish, 930 A.2d 416, 418–20 (N.J. 2007); Doe v. Planned Parenthood, 956 
N.E.2d 564, 567 (Ill. App. Ct. 2011). Although the defendants won in both these cases, the mere 
existence of these suits represents the belief of certain patients that statements of fetal humanity would 
have been material to their decisions. 
79. For example, laws requiring certain ideas to be taught in public schools also reveal serious 
concerns about the power of government-mandated information to manipulate behavior. See, e.g., ALA. 
CODE § 16-40A-2 (2020) (requiring any sex education program in Alabama to “include and emphasize” 
that abstinence is the only completely reliable protection against pregnancy and that “homosexuality is 
not a lifestyle acceptable to the general public”). 
80. See, e.g., 181 South Inc. v. Fischer, 454 F.3d 228, 230, 233–34 (3d Cir. 2006) (considering 
state interests in passing a law prohibiting “‘lewdness or immoral activity’ on liquor-licensed premises” 
as part of an examination into the law’s constitutionality); Bernard v. Individual Members of the Ind. 
Med. Licensing Bd., 392 F. Supp. 3d 935, 956–59 (S.D. Ind. 2019) (considering state interests in passing 
a law limiting abortion as part of an examination into whether that law constituted an undue burden on 
abortion access). 
81. See Russell W. Galloway, Means-End Scrutiny in American Constitutional Law, 21 LOY. 
L.A. L. REV. 449, 449 n.1 (1998) (“Means-end scrutiny is used, for example, in enforcing the 
requirements of substantive due process, equal protection, freedom of speech, free exercise of religion, 
the necessary and proper clause, the dormant commerce clause, the contract clause and the privileges 
and immunities clause.”). 











enacted the law—for example, if its only aim is to infringe on its residents’ 
constitutional rights—then the law should not exist. Further, if the state 
asserts a justifiable end but crafts a law poorly designed to meet that end, 
such behavior casts doubt on the state’s true intentions and, as a result, the 
legitimacy of that law. This Section will outline a variety of possible ends 
that a perinatal hospice notification law might meet and examine how well 
different categories of perinatal hospice notification laws meet those ends.82 
1. Protecting Life and Improving Quality of Life 
In most contexts, the idea that a state has an interest in protecting life or 
improving quality of life is relatively uncontroversial: ideally, a state should 
want to do what it can to protect the lives of its residents. The police power 
of states “to provide for the public health, safety, and morals” legitimizes 
this interest.83 In the context of reproduction, a purported interest in 
protecting life is more controversial due to widespread disagreement about 
whether (or at what point) fetuses qualify as “lives” for the state to protect 
and to what extent, if any, fetal needs can affect the choices made by those 
who carry them.84 
Is a state interest in protecting life or improving quality of life an 
appropriate reason for enacting a perinatal hospice notification law? 
Perinatal hospice is a medically recognized treatment program designed to 
help not only fetuses and newborns but also their families who may be 
grappling with tremendous grief, stress, and fear.85 While a perinatal 
hospice program may or may not extend fetal or neonatal life, it can improve 
the quality of parental and familial life by helping surviving family 
members heal from loss. Accordingly, enacting a perinatal hospice 
notification law could simply manifest the state’s interest in protecting life 
and improving quality of life. 
The likelihood of this interest being the driving force behind a perinatal 
hospice notification law varies depending on the law’s trigger. A diagnosis-
triggered notification law could be created out of an interest in improving 
quality of life because it would promptly and unobtrusively address all 
individuals whose lives may be improved by perinatal hospice care.86 An 
abortion-triggered notification law may still have this goal, but such laws 
 
82. A full examination of the constitutionality of the various perinatal hospice notification laws 
is beyond the scope of this Note. Instead, this Section uses a means-end analysis to consider how best to 
craft a legitimate and beneficial perinatal hospice notification law. 
83. See, e.g., Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 569 (1991) (defining the state police 
power). 
84. See Strauss, supra note 74. 
85. See supra Part I. 












are always underinclusive (notifying only those who seek abortion, not all 
who receive life-limiting fetal diagnoses)87 and sometimes also 
overinclusive (notifying all those who seek an abortion regardless of 
whether they are eligible for perinatal hospice services).88 This poor overlap 
of the eligible and notified populations suggests that the motivation for 
passing an abortion-triggered notification law is something other than 
protecting the quality of fetal and familial life.89 
2. Impeding Abortion Access 
A state interest in impeding abortion access is distinct from protecting 
life. A state may protect life and improve its residents’ quality of life without 
impeding abortion access (for example, by expanding access to free or low-
cost mental health care).90 Abortion before the point of fetal viability 
remains a constitutional right despite widespread legislative attempts to 
curtail or eliminate opportunities to vindicate this right.91 A state does not 
have a legitimate interest, in and of itself, in impeding its residents’ exercise 
of their constitutional rights.92 As a result, states cannot pass a perinatal 
hospice notification law with the purpose of impeding abortion access. 
Although no existing perinatal hospice notification law explicitly asserts 
this impermissible goal, many such laws openly state that their purpose is 
to entice eligible persons toward perinatal hospice and away from 
abortion.93  
 
87. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-2158.A.1 (2020); ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-16-2304 (2020); IND. 
CODE § 16-34-2-1.1(b) (2019); MINN. STAT. § 145.4242(c) (2019); OKLA. STAT. tit. 63, § 1-746.2 
(2020).  
88. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-6709 (2019); WIS. STAT. § 253.10(3)(c)2.em (2020). 
89. One motivation to pass abortion-restrictive laws in general may come from social judgments 
about pregnant women, particularly ideas about their nature or the necessary consequences of choices 
they are presumed to have made. Reva B. Siegel, Reasoning from the Body: A Historical Perspective on 
Abortion Regulation and Questions of Equal Protection, 44 STAN. L. REV. 261, 350 (1992). 
90. Reva Siegel articulates a distinction between pro-life measures that affirm women’s 
reproductive autonomy and pro-life measures that do not, arguing that the latter should be subject to less 
deference. Reva B. Siegel, ProChoiceLife: Asking Who Protects Life and How—and Why It Matters in 
Law and Politics, 93 IND. L.J. 207, 209 (2018). 
91. See, e.g., Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292, 2300 (2016) (quoting 
Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 878 (1992) (plurality opinion)) (“[T]here ‘exists’ 
an ‘undue burden’ on a woman’s right to decide to have an abortion, and consequently a provision of 
law is constitutionally invalid, if the ‘purpose or effect’ of the provision ‘is to place a substantial obstacle 
in the path of a woman seeking an abortion before the fetus attains viability.’”) (emphasis omitted). 
92. See Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. at 2300 (impositions that “undu[ly] burden” abortion access are 
unconstitutional). 
93. The Arizona, Arkansas, Minnesota and Oklahoma perinatal hospice notification laws openly 
frame perinatal hospice as “an alternative to abortion.” ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-2158 (2020); ARK. 
CODE ANN. § 20-16-2304 (2020); MINN. STAT. § 145.4242(c) (2019); OKLA. STAT. tit. 63, § 1-746.2 
(2020). Indiana law does not use this phrasing but still describes its purpose as “ensur[ing] that: (1) 
 











Outside of abortion, the state frequently mandates the provision of 
information to aid individuals in making decisions and to encourage certain 
decisions over others. Mandatory printing of nutrition facts on food and 
drinks,94 mandatory provision of gambling addiction helpline numbers in 
casinos,95 and mandatory disclosures about medical care96 are just a few of 
the countless examples of state laws wielding information to encourage 
residents to align their behavior with what the state thinks is best.97 
However, legislators creating laws that regulate abortion must exercise great 
caution in crafting incentives. “Nudging” people’s choices about the 
exercise of constitutional rights, such as the free exercise of religion or 
freedom of speech, is unlikely to be legally permissible.98 
Asking whether such state incentives should exist at all is pointless; 
every choice incentivizes something.99 Even purposeful neutrality among a 
variety of options frames those options as equally good—a value judgment 
with which some will agree and others will not.100 As a result, 
“incentivization” cannot be the dividing factor between acceptable and 
 
women considering abortion after receiving a diagnosis of a lethal fetal anomaly are informed of the 
availability of perinatal hospice care; and (2) women choosing abortion after receiving a diagnosis of a 
lethal fetal anomaly are making a fully informed decision.” IND. CODE § 16-25-4.5-1 (2019). Even more 
bluntly, Indiana law also requires perinatal hospice-eligible abortion seekers who have received the 
mandatory perinatal hospice information but have still chosen to get an abortion to fill out an additional 
form. IND. CODE § 16-34-2-1.1(c) (2019). 
94. See Michelle I. Banker, I Saw the Sign: The New Federal Menu-Labeling Law and Lessons 
from Local Experience, 65 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 901, 903 (2010) (describing menu-labeling laws as a 
“regulatory approach to combating obesity”). 
95. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 551.118(2) (2019) (requiring a gambling helpline phone number to 
be provided in certain designated slot machine areas). 
96. For example, Indiana has a law mandating certain disclosures to prospective general hospice 
patients (i.e., non-perinatal hospice patients, such as adults with terminal cancer). IND. CODE § 16-25-7-
1 (2019). 
97. For a thorough examination of the broad social influence of incentives in a scheme of 
“libertarian paternalism,” see RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING 
DECISIONS ABOUT HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS 5 (2008). Thaler and Sunstein’s theory focuses 
on small, subtle changes (for example, rearranging the placement of healthy food in a cafeteria to put it 
at eye level, id. at 1–6) rather than the somewhat intrusive efforts of certain state legislatures. 
Nonetheless, the idea that true neutrality is impossible applies effectively to the actions of governments, 
including in the contexts of perinatal hospice and abortion. 
98. See, e.g., Lamont v. Postmaster Gen., 381 U.S. 301, 302, 307 (1965) (holding that a law 
requiring individuals who mail “communist political propaganda” to issue a written request before that 
mail would be delivered is an unconstitutional deterrent to free speech); Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 
581, 586, 599 (1992) (holding that a public high school directing a rabbi to give a nonsectarian prayer 
at graduation is an Establishment Clause violation even though students may choose not to attend 
graduation). 
99. THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 97, at 3 (asserting that “there is no such thing as a ‘neutral’ 
design”).  
100. Consider a state law mandating that those who disagree about the health effects of cigarettes 
be given equal time and resources to defend their position in public school health classes. Cigarettes are 
conclusively recognized to be harmful to human health; “neutrality” in this case actually serves to unduly 












unacceptable state behavior. Where the line of permissibility should be 
drawn is a deeply subjective question.  
Though there are different ways to determine the point at which 
permissible “nudging” crosses over into impermissible coercion or 
infringement upon rights, it is never a legitimate state interest to enact a law 
solely to infringe upon an individual’s right to an abortion (as distinct from 
protecting life or another purpose).101 As a result, if this is the purpose of a 
perinatal hospice notification law, such a law cannot be permissible under 
the state’s police power. 
In determining whether impeding abortion is the purpose of a perinatal 
hospice notification law, the trigger for notification again provides insight. 
Logically, abortion-triggered laws make it much likelier that the state’s 
interest is in impermissibly coercing individuals not to get an abortion. If 
the goal is to prevent as many abortions as possible, a law which is 
specifically tethered to abortion or overinclusive of the abortion-seeking 
population makes sense. Since this goal is impermissible, perinatal hospice 
notification requirements that fall into this category likely lack a legitimate 
basis for their enactment. 
3. Promoting Best Medical Practices 
A state may have an interest in promoting the best available medical 
practices by informing the eligible population of patients about the existence 
of such practices. This interest would clearly fall under the protection of 
public health and is therefore enforceable under the police power of the 
state.102 For example, some states may enact licensing requirements for 
 
101. Instead, courts apply the “undue burden” standard, in which “a state regulation [that] has the 
purpose or effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion of a 
nonviable fetus” is unduly burdensome and therefore constitutionally impermissible. Planned 
Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 877 (1992) (plurality opinion). Casey allows life-
promoting measures on the part of the state as long as they are not a “substantial obstacle” to an 
individual’s choice. Id. at 877–78. As a result, while the purpose of infringing upon abortion access is 
impermissible, the purpose of promoting life is permissible under Casey. 
102. In many ways, this state interest fits under the umbrella of Part III.B.1, which describes an 
interest in preserving life or improving quality of life. This Note separates the two in order to focus on 
different aspects of such an interest: the “life” issue in Part III.B.1, and the issue of medical legitimacy 
here. 











doctors and other medical professionals103 and laws prohibiting medical 
practices found to be harmful.104  
Is a state interest in promoting best medical practices an appropriate 
reason to enact a perinatal hospice notification law? Perinatal hospice is a 
legitimate form of medical care, and ACOG and the American Academy of 
Nursing both encourage medical professionals to provide information about 
this type of care to eligible patients.105 However, matters surrounding 
reproduction are often politically charged and singled out for cumbersome 
legislation,106 so comparing laws concerning general hospice care107 in the 
states with perinatal hospice notification laws can provide context about 
appropriate levels of state intervention in comparable medical practices. 
Regulating perinatal hospice but not general hospice would suggest that 
either (1) something is medically unique about perinatal hospice which 
justifies regulation unnecessary for other kinds of hospice, or (2) promoting 
best medical practices is not actually the intent of the law. Some risks of 
perinatal hospice have no equivalent in general hospice, but these risks 
primarily concern social tension and disagreements with family members, 
peers, and healthcare providers.108 Since perinatal hospice disclosures in the 
 
103. The Supreme Court affirmed the legitimacy of state licensing requirements for doctors in 
Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U.S. 114, 122 (1889): 
The power of the State to provide for the general welfare of its people authorizes it to prescribe 
all such regulations as, in its judgment, will secure or tend to secure them against the 
consequences of ignorance and incapacity as well as of deception and fraud. As one means to 
this end . . . [states have required] an examination of parties by competent persons, or . . . a 
certificate to them in the form of a diploma or license from an institution established for 
instruction on the subjects, scientific and otherwise, with which such pursuits have to deal. 
Id.  
104. For example, states have banned the practice of conversion therapy for lesbian, gay, bisexual, 
transgender, and queer/questioning (LGBTQ) youth as a result of scientific and cultural advancements 
demonstrating the severe psychological damage this practice may cause. E.g., Youth Mental Health 
Protection Act, 405 ILL. COMP. STAT. 48/20 (2016); N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 6509-e (Consol. 2019). 
105. See supra notes 23–24 and accompanying text. 
106. Bonnie S. Jones, Sara Daniel & Lindsay K. Cloud, State Law Approaches to Facility 
Regulation of Abortion and Other Office Interventions, 108 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 486, 491 (2018) 
(finding that “states had frequently singled out abortion provision [sic] for targeted regulation” and that 
“states had virtually never singled out other office interventions for such separate legal treatment”). 
Sawicki, supra note 73, at 35, suggests that the reason for additional regulation is “the inherent 
controversy about the sanctity of life underlying the abortion debate.” Normative judgments about 
women, sexuality, and childbearing are another potential cause of this heightened legislative attention. 
See Siegel, supra note 90, at 222–23. 
107. This Note will use the term “general hospice” to refer to non-perinatal hospice: that is, 
hospice care for patients who are already born when they are diagnosed with a terminal condition 
qualifying them for hospice care. 
108. In terms of overarching risks of perinatal hospice, ACOG identifies the possibilities that (1) 
“there may be differences of opinion between family members before and after the delivery of the 
infant,” and (2) “there may be differences between parents and the neonatal care providers about 
appropriate postnatal therapies, especially if the postnatal diagnosis and prognosis differ substantially 













states that require them do not focus on these risks,109 it is unlikely that such 
risks warrant different treatment of perinatal hospice and general hospice 
under the law. 
The laws surrounding general hospice care vary by state, just as perinatal 
hospice notification laws do. Of the states with perinatal hospice 
notification laws, none have a general hospice notification law triggered in 
a comparable way to its perinatal counterpart.110 Abortion loses its 
(purported) relevance as a potential trigger for hospice of those already 
born, and no particular diagnosis prompts notification. Some of these states 
do have general hospice notification standards, but they are typically less 
intrusive than perinatal hospice notification laws. For example, Nebraska 
and Kansas law both require the maintenance of a website with information 
about general hospice care.111 Indiana requires disclosures to be made to 
prospective general hospice patients,112 while Minnesota requires 
 
& Ethics, supra note 19, at e85. Additionally, new parents of infants with life-limiting conditions may 
experience social invalidation of their parental roles or competency from peers and healthcare providers. 
Anthony Adams Lathrop, A Narrative Analysis of Perinatal Hospice Stories 136–38 (May 2010) 
(electronically published Ph.D. dissertation, Marquette University), http://epublications.marquette.edu/c 
gi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1042&context=dissertations_mu [https://perma.cc/5ZMX-JP8D].  
109. Only Nebraska, Indiana, Oklahoma, Arizona, and Kansas require the state to maintain a 
website or online brochure with information about perinatal hospice. See supra notes 34–42 (identifying 
perinatal hospice laws and their requirements). None of the online resources these five states provide 
discuss social tension or disagreement with others as risks relevant to a decision about perinatal hospice. 
NEB. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., COMPASSION AND CARE FOR MEDICALLY CHALLENGING 
PREGNANCIES ACT (2018), http://dhhs.ne.gov/MCAH/MI-LB506-InformationSupportSheet.pdf [https:/ 
/perma.cc/2BG6-UHLK] (stating that perinatal hospice will assist individuals in medical decision-
making but failing to mention social tension as a relevant concern); IND. STATE DEP’T OF HEALTH, 
PERINATAL HOSPICE, https://www.in.gov/isdh/files/Perinatal%20Hospice%20Brochure.pdf [https://per 
ma.cc/U3HZ-EG8D] (explicitly describing perinatal hospice as a more psychologically beneficial 
choice than termination); OKLA. MED. BD., PERINATAL HOSPICE AND PALLIATIVE CARE FOR A 
DIAGNOSIS THAT INDICATES A BABY WILL DIE BEFORE OR AFTER BIRTH, http://www.okmedicalboard.o 
rg/download/733/Perinatal+Hospice+Information+for+Patients.pdf [https://perma.cc/YV6Q-96GE] 
(offering various kinds of “support” and referrals without specifying the risks of perinatal hospice care); 
ARIZ. DEP’T OF HEALTH SERVS., A WOMAN’S RIGHT TO KNOW (2014), https://www.azdhs.gov/docume 
nts/prevention/womens-childrens-health/informed-consent/right-to-know-resources.pdf [https://perma. 
cc/4EKN-AZ2H] (briefly describing “a range of services”); KAN. DEP’T OF HEALTH & ENV’T, IF YOU 
ARE PREGNANT DIRECTORY OF AVAILABLE SERVICES, http://www.womansrighttoknow.org/download/ 
Directory_of_Services_English.pdf (listing resources, including perinatal hospice resources, without 
description of risks). 
110. See infra notes 111–113. Arizona has certification requirements for hospice institutions, but 
it does not require individual notification of eligible patients. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-409 
(2020). Arkansas codifies its general hospice provisions at ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 20-8-701–703 (2019). 
These provisions address the creation of a task force to recommend palliative care initiatives to the 
legislature, but the laws make no mention of individual notification comparable to a perinatal hospice 
notification law. See id. Oklahoma codifies its general hospice provisions at OKLA. STAT. tit. 63, §§ 1-
860.1–862 (2020). These provisions deal with hospice licensing and do not discuss individual 
notification of potential patients. See id. Wisconsin codifies its general hospice provisions at WIS. STAT. 
§§ 50.94 (2020). These provisions also deal with hospice licensing and do not discuss individual 
notification of potential patients. See id. 
111. NEB. REV. STAT. § 71-4503 (2017); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-1,261 (2019). 
112. IND. CODE § 16-25-7-2 (2019). 











information and hospice referral services to be available “in all regions of 
the state.”113 While these requirements are significantly less demanding than 
the perinatal hospice notification requirements in each of these states,114 the 
fact that some legislation exists to regulate general hospice implies that the 
lawmakers of these states perceive some necessity for state intervention to 
promote best medical practices.115 
In trying to examine the authenticity of a state’s purported interest, the 
trigger for notification remains relevant. If “promoting best available 
medical practices” includes promoting those practices to the eligible 
population (which it should), then diagnosis-triggered laws are much more 
likely to promote best available medical practices than abortion-triggered 
laws. Diagnosis-triggered laws, in contrast to the underinclusive and 
potentially overinclusive abortion-triggered laws, aim to inform all eligible 
candidates and no ineligible candidates, making such laws better suited to 
be a manifestation of a state’s interest in promoting the best available 
medical practices.116 
4. Protecting Individuals from Emotional Distress 
States may claim that they enacted perinatal hospice notification laws to 
protect pregnant individuals from the future regret of an abortion.117 
Because many pregnant persons may feel that they have no other option and 
choose to abort when they discover that their fetus has a life-limiting 
condition, states may argue that notification laws are necessary to inform 
individuals of alternatives to abortion118 in order to protect them from 
eventual regret and emotional distress.  
The state has a limited interest in protecting against certain kinds of 
emotional distress. The tort causes of action “intentional infliction of 
emotional harm”119 and “negligent conduct directly inflicting emotional 
 
113. MINN. STAT. § 144A.755 (2019). 
114. See supra notes 34–42. 
115. It is also possible that these states’ general hospice legislation is motivated by a state interest 
in preserving the life and health of their occupants. See supra Part III.B.1.  
116. See supra Part II.A. 
117. This rationale is most relevant to abortion-triggered notification laws, but it may also apply 
implicitly or explicitly to diagnosis-triggered notification laws. For example, Indiana’s diagnosis-
triggered notification law specifically references abortion-seekers as a target audience. See supra note 
51.  
118. For examples of laws and news articles categorizing perinatal hospice in this unhelpful way, 
see supra notes 26–27 and accompanying text. 
119. “An actor who by extreme and outrageous conduct intentionally or recklessly causes severe 
emotional harm to another is subject to liability for that emotional harm and, if the emotional harm 
causes bodily harm, also for the bodily harm.” RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL 












harm on another”120 both demonstrate that, at least sometimes, the state (via 
the judicial system) will enforce an individual’s right to be free of undue 
emotional distress.121  
While some state protection from emotional distress is legally 
permissible, it does not necessarily follow that a state may enact legislation 
to protect individuals from the possible emotional consequences of 
exercising their constitutional rights. For example, the right to a trial by jury 
is protected, yet no statute mandates the dissemination of a government-
issued pamphlet about the emotional distress that a criminal defendant could 
experience as a result of such a trial. Intentional and negligent infliction of 
emotional distress both involve at least two parties122—the victim and the 
tortfeasor—and require that the latter have engaged in some type of 
outrageous action which does not consist solely of the exercise of a legal 
right.123 Protecting individuals from accidentally inflicting emotional 
distress upon themselves by exercising their own rights in a perfectly legal 
way which they may later regret is not comparable.  
In addition to these legal and logical flaws, enacting perinatal hospice 
notification laws in order to protect women124 from the emotional distress 
of an abortion they later regret treads into the region of sexist paternalism. 
While not as extreme a measure as banning certain types of abortions due 
to the state’s perception of the risk of psychological harm,125 such a 
protective motive is questionable at best given the many psychological risks 
of other less-regulated medical procedures.126 There is no reason but sexism 
 
120. “An actor whose negligent conduct causes serious emotional harm to another is subject to 
liability to the other if the conduct: (a) places the other in danger of immediate bodily harm and the 
emotional harm results from the danger; or (b) occurs in the course of specified categories of activities, 
undertakings, or relationships in which negligent conduct is especially likely to cause serious emotional 
harm.” RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 47 (AM. LAW 
INST. 2012). 
121. E.g., Childers v. Geile, 367 S.W.3d 576, 580 (Ky. 2012) (identifying a “right to be free of 
emotional distress”); Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Superior Court, 286 Cal. Rptr. 3d 855, 865 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 1991) (describing another case as establishing an invasion of “the right to be free of the intentional 
or negligent infliction of emotional distress to one’s person”). 
122. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM §§ 46–47 
(AM. LAW INST. 2012). 
123. The mere exercise of a legal right, even if the conduct is substantially certain to cause severe 
emotional distress, does not give rise to liability for intentional infliction of emotional harm. 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 46 cmt. e (AM. LAW 
INST. 2012). 
124. While not all who seek abortion identify as women, many perinatal hospice notification laws 
are written in a gendered manner. E.g., NEB. REV. STAT. § 71-5003 (2017) (“[i]nform the pregnant 
woman”); OKLA. STAT. tit. 63, § 1-746.2.1 (2020) (“[i]n the case of a female seeking an abortion”). 
125. For a deeper discussion of the harm and implications of outright bans on particular kinds of 
abortion procedures, see Manian, supra note 46, at 257–62. 
126. See Manian, supra note 46, at 257 (“Any medical treatment decision can lead to regret in 
some percentage of patients. If protection from regret were sufficient to permit government regulation, 
 











to explain why women should face more regulation than men when making 
high-pressure, potentially emotional medical decisions. 
In an attempt to avoid perpetuating sexism, the state may reframe the 
emotional distress issue: pregnancy is an emotionally significant life event 
for many people, and the state has an interest in ensuring that individuals 
pregnant with fetuses diagnosed with life-limiting conditions are made 
explicitly aware of their care options, including perinatal hospice, in order 
to minimize the negative effects of grief during this time. This description 
is reminiscent of the state interest in preserving life and health described 
above.127 This framing is broad enough to encompass all existing perinatal 
hospice laws, at least theoretically, and it sidesteps the counterproductive 
focus on abortion. However, in avoiding those issues, two questions arise. 
First, while the unexpected diagnosis of one’s fetus with a life-limiting 
condition no doubt holds the potential to be traumatic for many would-be 
parents, it seems no less traumatizing than the diagnosis of, for example, a 
three-year-old child with a terminal illness which qualifies for general 
(pediatric) hospice care.128 These realities are both viscerally emotionally 
distressing, and it is unclear why a state might choose to protect against one 
kind of emotional distress and not the other, as no state has pediatric hospice 
notification requirements for parents of young children.129 Unless the 
concern is about the emotional consequences of an abortion decision—
which is invalid, as the state has no justification for protecting individuals 
from the emotional ramifications of exercising their constitutional rights—
 
government could override patient decision-making for any medical procedure, eviscerating the legal 
and ethical norm of informed consent in healthcare.”). While Manian’s discussion focuses on the ban of 
a particular subset of abortions in Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124 (2007), her logic remains relevant 
here. 
127. See supra Part III.B.1. 
128. For a heartfelt and reflective look at a pediatric hospice institution, see Helen Ouyang, Where 
Should a Child Die? Hospice Homes Help Families with the Unimaginable, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (May 15, 
2019), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/05/15/magazine/child-hospice.html [https://perma.cc 
/LAV2-RC87]. 
129. My research indicates that no state has a law of this type. Some states address pediatric 
palliative care, but none address any type of mandatory or permissive notification or disclosure specific 
to the pediatric context. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 25.5-5-305 (2020) (seeking federal authorization 
for pediatric hospice care in light of current barriers); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 111, § 24K (2020) 
(establishing a pediatric palliative care program but making no mention of notification); N.J. STAT. ANN. 
§ 26:2H-12.75 (West 2020) (declaring the importance of pediatric hospice care generally); N.Y. PUB. 
HEALTH LAW § 4015 (Consol. 2020) (authorizing establishment of a pediatric hospice and palliative 
care program); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3712.061 (LexisNexis 2019) (describing requirements of 
pediatric respite care programs but making no mention of notification). Ohio requires many kinds of 
healthcare facilities to “[e]stablish a system for identifying patients or residents who could benefit from 
palliative care” and “[p]rovide information on palliative care to patients and residents who could benefit 
from palliative care[,]” but these requirements apply to hospice for all ages, making no reference to the 
emotional impact of hospice for one age group over another. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3701.362 
(LexisNexis 2019). See also VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 1871 (2020) (outlining patient rights, including 
the right to be informed of palliative care options, for all ages, as well as the specific pediatric right to 












there does not appear to be a legally significant difference between choices 
about perinatal and pediatric hospice in terms of emotional pain.  
Second, even assuming arguendo that there is something uniquely 
emotionally distressing about an adverse fetal diagnosis that justifies special 
laws, it is uncertain whether abortion-triggered notification requirements 
will actually prevent emotional distress in a significant enough portion of 
the population to merit the intrusion. Most individuals seeking an abortion 
are already certain of their decision.130 If perinatal hospice-eligible 
individuals are uniquely susceptible to emotional distress, state-imposed 
attempts to second-guess the difficult decision to get an abortion may cause 
more emotional distress than they prevent.  
In this light, consider again the woman choosing abortion from Part 
II.A.131 After deliberating heavily and coming to a difficult decision, she 
reaches the clinic only to be told that there is another option the state would 
like her to consider. While it is possible she will feel joyful at the prospect 
of an additional option she had not known about before, she may also feel 
guilty for making what she wholeheartedly believes to be the best choice 
for her in the face of perceived state attempts to dissuade her from it. She 
may feel resentful. She may feel conflicted. She may feel any number of 
things, many of which may be distressing in nature. Therefore, the 
assumption that notifying eligible individuals of perinatal hospice care will 
protect them from severe emotional distress is tenuous at best—not 
necessarily false, but not supported by enough evidence to justify it either.132 
CONCLUSION 
Perinatal hospice notification laws address an emotionally resonant 
subsection of the American population: pregnant persons and their families 
whose wanted fetuses are diagnosed with life-limiting conditions. There are 
risks of harm if such laws exist, including fears of state intrusion into an 
intimate and painful decision for many families, questions about the ability 
of the affected individual to make the best possible choice when the state 
expresses a preference or imposes shame, and concerns about the state’s 
true interest in enacting such a law. There are also risks of harm if such laws 
do not exist, most notably the risk of preventable distress for eligible 
 
130. See Foster et al., supra note 44, at 120; Gatter et al., supra note 44, at 81. 
131. Supra Part II.A. 
132. Compare Weber, supra note 25 (describing the experience of a woman who “burst into tears” 
upon learning about the existence of perinatal hospice care after she had already chosen to terminate her 
pregnancy), with Tara Culp-Ressler, One of the Nation’s Cruelest Anti-Abortion Laws Is Starting to 
Gain Ground, THINKPROGRESS (Feb. 21, 2014, 6:30 PM), https://thinkprogress.org/one-of-the-nations-
cruelest-anti-abortion-laws-is-starting-to-gain-ground-bd5b926c7732/ [https://perma.cc/9XFL-SSWS] 
(describing the potentially harmful emotional impact of perinatal hospice notification laws). 











individuals who would have chosen perinatal hospice if they had known it 
existed.  
Due to the serious problems with abortion-triggered notification 
requirements, such laws are ill-suited to furthering any permissible 
government interest. Abortion-triggered notification requirements do not 
notify the right population: they fail to include certain eligible candidates 
while also sometimes notifying ineligible abortion-seekers. Furthermore, 
they normally require notification after an eligible individual has already 
come to a decision about the best course of action, thereby risking improper 
state interference with the exercise of a constitutional right and unnecessary 
emotional distress to the eligible abortion-seeker. Abortion-triggered 
notification requirements bring into being all the risks of a perinatal hospice 
notification requirement while failing to deliver the intended benefits. 
Diagnosis-triggered notification requirements, in contrast, fit neatly 
within the state’s police power as an effort to preserve life and promote best 
medical practices, and they minimize the potential for emotional distress by 
delivering the information at the time of fetal diagnosis—before the patient 
has come to any decision about how to proceed. Diagnosis-triggered 
notification requirements track well with the goals of informed consent, 
providing information that many individuals will find relevant to their 
decision while minimizing the potential for improper state influence on the 
outcome. Such requirements ensure that the right population of patients 
receives the right information at the right time. 
The choice not to enact any notification requirement and leave doctors 
to inform patients on their own is another logical decision. While such an 
approach risks a lack of information to those who need it, it also avoids all 
of the potential negative consequences—misogynistic restrictions on 
women’s decision-making, infringement upon constitutional rights, and 
unnecessary governmental red tape—that come from state attempts to 
interfere with the doctor-patient relationship.  
Either a diagnosis-triggered notification law or the deliberate absence of 
a law will serve the needs of a state effectively, and lawmakers can debate 
which choice is best for their constituencies. Different localities may have 
different needs related to perinatal hospice care. For example, some states 
may not have a perinatal hospice program, making notification ineffective 
because eligible individuals cannot access the care they have been notified 
about. Such a state would not benefit from a diagnosis-triggered notification 
law. Additionally, as perinatal hospice becomes more familiar to patients 
and doctors nationwide, notification requirements may become less relevant 
because individuals will already be aware of existing services. Nonetheless, 
by crafting a notification regime that aligns with legitimate state interests, 












integrity of the doctor-patient relationship or an individual’s freedom to 
make the best available choice. Such a solution, whether through a 
diagnosis-triggered law or no law at all, lets the state provide access to 
resources, then step out of the way. 
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